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difficult to justify holding a contractor liable absolutely when blasting
results in injury, while at the same time granting him immunity from
liability for damages resulting from dredging or other direct invasions of property. Certainly a contractor compelled to use explosives by his contract with the state is no more at fault for resulting
injury than for that caused by the grading of roads, the movement
of heavy equipment, or the changing of a river's course. The contractor has no choice as to the means or methods to be used, since
they are set out in the terms of his agreement, and it certainly is a
harsh rule which holds one liable for merely fulfilling his contractual
obligations. If explosives cause damage, the government which designated their use should pay for the resulting injury, and not the contractor-agent who simply followed instructions. The federal government and many states, under acts similar to the Federal Tort Claims
Act, have waived their immunity from suit in certain instances; it is
suggested that this should be one such instance. If this were done,
the contractor would be relieved of a questionable liability and the
injured party guaranteed a fair recovery.
JOsEPH E. UIUCH

INADVERTENCE AS A BASIS FOR DRAWEE
BANK LIABILITY
When the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law was passed, it was
intended to serve a dual purpose: (1)to solve the problems arising
from the Law Merchant and (2) to codify common law decisions affectnegotiable paper. While it did in fact solve many problems, it contained principles which have given rise to much additional litigation.
One of the more crucial problems arising under the NIL is whether
inadvertent drawees are included in Section 137, which provides:
"Where a drawee to whom a bill is delivered for acceptance
destroys the same, or refuses within twenty-four hours after
such delivery, or within such period as the holder may allow, to
return the bill accepted or non-accepted to the holder, he will
be deemed to have accepted the same."'
In GeneralFinance Corp. v. Central Bank & Trust Co.2 the Court
"This is the exact wording of § 137 of the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law
as originally written by Crawford. Some states have accepted it in its entirety without changing any of the wording, whereas other states, as will be shown in this
comment, have modified the wording.
2264 F.2d 869 (5 th Cir. 1959).
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of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit recently dealt with this problem. General Finance on July 17, 1957, deposited and received credit in its ac-

count at the First National Bank for a check drawn on the Central
Bank and Trust Company. On July 18, First National presented
the check to Central for payment, and Central paid the item conditionally by entering a bank credit in favor of First National. On July
22, the check was returned for insufficient funds, and First National
charged the check back to its depositor. General Finance objected
to the charging of this item against its account, claiming that under
Florida law3 the holding of a check by the payor bank beyond the
time allotted by statute constituted final payment. The United States
District Court for the Southern District of Florida rejected this contention and found for the defendant, stating that this was a deferred
4
posting statute providing for conditional crediting.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed this decision,
stating that while this was in fact a deferred posting statute, appellee
fell within the express exception to the statute, rather than within its
ameliorating provisions.5 The court held that under the express exception a check shall be deemed accepted by a drawee bank when it is reI'his case involved the interpretation of Fla. Stat. Ann. §§ 676.07, 676.08, 67648,
676.55 (1945). This comment places special emphasis upon § 676.55 which is the
Florida clarification to § 137 of the NIL.
'163 F. Supp. 372 (S.D. Fla. 1958). There was no privity between General Finance and Central, and the only rights that General Finance had against Central
were those that First National would have had against Central. Thus, by holding that
this was a deferred posting statute, the court barred recovery from Central by First
National as well as by General Finance.
5'"Appellees here contend that this statute is not at all what its title calls it,
but is a deferred posting statute. We understand this argument to be that, without
some statutory provision to the contrary, the payment of a check either by cash or
entry of a credit to the amount of the depositor or collecting bank (here the credit
to First National entered by Central on Thursday) would amount to irrevocable final
payment by the drawee, and thus it would greatly interfere with prompt banking
practices in today's commercial world if the state of the drawer's account must be
carefully checked and a simultaneous charge be posted there when cash or credit
was given to the depositor or collecting bank; that to prevent this as between a
bank and its depositor the deposit contract was devised, thus making the deposit
subject to final payment; and as between payor and the drawer a deferred posting
statute made the transaction subject to reversal until an actual charge to the account of the drawer was posted on the books. It may well be that the legislature
did intend to accomplish this objective in adopting Section 676.55; and undoubtedly
it accomplished this result ....
But the difficulty of Central's theory is that the act
which gave the right to deferred posting also put a limit on the time during which
the delay could be extended. ...But on the facts of this record it [Central] did
not come within its ameliorating terms, because it fit rather into the exception
'unless * * * such item is retained by the drawee or payor bank longer than the
end of the business day following its receipt *
*.'" 264 F.2d at 874-75.
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tained beyond the end of the business day following the day of receipt.8 Thus Florida, by statute, has aligned itself with the present
majority of states which through judicial interpretation have given
this same meaning to state negotiable instrument statutes similar to
the controversial Section 137 of the NIL.
Before considering the conflict which has arisen from the various
interpretations of Section 137, it would be advisable to compare this
section as originally written with the subsequent Florida clarification. A literal reading of Section 137 seemingly precludes holding a
drawee bank liable for inadvertence, but this interpretation definitely
contravenes the law today in most states. On the other hand, the
Florida statute uses "retained" rather then "refuses" in order to
show that negligence of the drawee 'is a basis for liability, and is
worded in this manner:
"A check or draft received for deposit or collection by a solvent
payor or drawee bank shall not be deemed paid or accepted
until the amount is charged to the account of the maker or
drawer unless, though not so charged, such item is retained by
the drawee or payor bank longer than the end of the busi7
ness day following its receipt."
Thus it is evident that a conflict exists between the majority interpretation of Section 137, adopted by statute in Florida, and the literal
interpretation supported by the minority of jurisdictions.
According to the Law Merchant, an acceptance might be written or
oral or implied from the conduct of the parties.8 However, a drawee
could retain a bill of exchange presented for acceptance indefinitely
unless a demand for its return was made.9 Retention of the instruOld. at 874. "We think, in effect, the legislature, recognizing the ambiguity existing under Sections 136 and 137, as shown by the conflicting decisions, determined
to set the matter at rest by saying that a check received by a solvent drawee bank
for deposit or collection (not for acceptance) has the option of charging it against
the drawer's account, paying it and carrying it as an overdraft or returning it by
the end of the business day following its receipt, in default of which it will be held
liable as having paid it."
Earlier on page 874, the court stated that "under this section [676.55] there is
no payment or acceptance without an actual charge to the account of the drawer
until the end of the business day following receipt of the item, thus eliminating
the 24 hour rule as to such an item, and settling by statute the dispute as to the
proper construction of Section 137 by using the word 'retain' instead of 'refuse to
return.'"
MFla. Stat. Ann § 676.55 (1945), further clarifying Fla. Stat. Ann. § 676.08.
Feezer, Acceptance Of Bills Of Exchange By Conduct, 12 Minn. L. Rev. 129,
130 (1927); Thulin, Form of the Acceptance, 14 Mich. L. Rev. 455 (1916).
9Williams v. Gallyon, 1o7 Ala. 439, 18 So. 162 (1895); Holbrook v. Payne, 151
Mass. 383, 24 N.E. 210 (i8go); Jeune v. Ward, i Barn. & Aid. 653, io6 Eng. Rep.
240 (K.B. 1818); Mason v. Barff, 2 Barn. & Aid. 26, 1o6 Eng. Rep. 277 (K.B. 1818).
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inent under certain circumstances constituted a conversion, but in.advertence alone was not enough.
Prior to the enactment of the NIL, the phrase "refuses to return"
was interpreted in New York, 10 Missouri," and Arkansas' 2 to be a
codification of the common law. This view, which at one time was the
overwhelming majority but has now become a rather small minority,
serves as a basis for the traditional solution to the problem of interpret3
ing statutes of this type.'
The current majority view, adopted by statute in Florida, had
14
its origin in the 19o8 Pennsylvania case of Wisner v. First Nat'l Bank,
in which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court said that the purpose of
Section 137 was to fix a definite time limit for accepting or refusing
the bill, and held that inadvertence of the drawee bank was a sufficient basis for the imposition of liability.'5 This decision, held applicable to checks as well as other instruments,' 6 was so novel that in 19o9
the legislature amended the negotiable instruments law so as to
provide that mere retention of the instrument would not be a sufficient basis for the imposition of liability.' 7 Some states adopted the
10In regard to the early New York statutes, see Matteson v. Moulton, 79 N.Y.
627 (188o). The court states that "the refusal mentioned in the statute ... refers to
something of a tortious character, implying an unauthorized conversion of the
bill by the drawee." Matteson v. Moulton, ii Hun 268, 270 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1877).
"Dickinson v. Marsh, 57 Mo. App. 566 (1894).
12St. Louis & S.W. Ry. v. James, 79 Ark. 490, 95 S.W. 804 (1 o6).
rWhen Illinois and South Dakota adopted the NIL, Section 137 was omitted to
preclude the general problem which this comment discusses.
U22o Pa. 21, 68 At. 955, 17 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1266 (19o8).
568 At. at 958. "It is apparent, we think, that in the enactment of this section
of the statute the Legislature regarded the presentation for acceptance as a demand
for an acceptance, which, when the bill is retained by the drawee, implies a demand for its return within the time specified, and that, therefore, the neglect or
failure to return is a refusal to return the bill.... The Law Merchant discourages
laches in parties to negotiable paper, and demands prompt action in the performance of the duties imposed upon them. It was not the intention of the Legislature
in the enactment of the negotiable instruments law to abolish this rule, and to
encourage delay or inaction in the holder or drawee of such paper. The intention
of the section in question [§ 237] was to expedite action by the drawee in accepting or refusing a bill presented and retained by him, and to fix a definite
time, which had previously been uncertain, in which he should act on the
bill.... The drawee must, therefore, act within 24 hours from the date of the
delivery of the bill .. "
6
Id at 597. "The contention of the defendant that Section 137 of the act does
not apply to a check presented to the drawee bank for payment is answered adversely tor its position by the act itself."
T
Pa. State. Ann. tit. 56, § 326 (193o). "Provided, That the mere retention of such
bill by the drawee, unless its return has been demanded, will not amount to an acceptance; And provided further, That the provisions of this section shall not
apply to checks."
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Wisner rule, notwithstanding its change by legislation, 8 while others
continued to adhere to the more traditional view that retention alone
was not an acceptance.
There were generally two lines of reasoning used by courts which
reached decisions contrary to Wisner. The first was that as a matter
of statutory interpretation mere retention is not sufficient to constitute
acceptance, for the statute itself uses the word "refusal," which is
synonymous with the idea that a conversion must take place. 19 The
second reason was that presentment for acceptance was not the same as
presentment for payment.20 This distinction is based upon the fact
that checks are presented only for payment, whereas time limits in
most statutes apply to presentment for acceptance of a bill of exchange.
Numerous other criticisms are suggested by these courts declining
to follow the Wisner interpretation. One such criticism is that although
a conversion was not necessary, mere physical reception is not sufficient
because additional acts are prerequisite to implying an acceptance. 2 1
Another criticism is that the Wisner view contravenes the intent of
the drafters to make the NIL exemplative of the common law.22 Those

courts rejecting Wisner find additional support in Section

132,23

which

1
9Miller v. Farmer's State Bank, 165 Minn. 339, 206 N.V. 930 (1925); Blackwelder v. Fergus Motor Co., 8o Mont. 374, 26o Pac. 734, 740 (1927); First State Bank
v. Black Bros. Co., 187 Okla. 224, 1o P.2d 802 (194); American Nat'l Bank v.

National Bank, 119 Okla. 149, 249 Pac. 424 (1926); Mt. Vernon Nat'l Bank v.
Canby State Bank, 129 Ore. 36, 276 Pac. 262, 63 A.L.R. 1133 (1929). For a more

complete listing of cases foll0cving Wisner see Brannan, Negotiable Instruments
Law § 137 ( 7 th ed. Beutel 1948).
19Matteson v. Moulton, 79 N.Y. 627 (88o); Peoples Nat'l Bank v. Swift, 134
Tenn. 175, 183 S.W. 725 (1916); Westberg v. Chicago Lum. & Coal Co., 117 Wis.
589, 94 N.W. 572 (19o3)- See notes ii

and 12 supra.

-Illinois Trust & Say. Bank v. Northern Bank & Trust Co., 214 InI. App. 44o
('919); Kentucky Title Say. Bank & Trust Co. v. Duvanan, 2o5 Ky. 8oi, 266 S.W.
667 (1924); First Nat'l Bank v. Talley, iii

Tex. 291, 285 S.W. 612 (1926); Lone Star

Trucking Co. v. City Nat'l Bank, 240 S.W. iooo (Tex. Civ. App. 1922).
21

Hibbard v. Parciak, 94 Conn. 562, 1o9 Atl. 725 (1920); Whitewater Comm. &
Say. Bank v. United States Bank, 224 Ill. App. 26 (1919) (did not allow an implied
acceptance and required an affirmative act of acceptance in writing); Southern Creosoting Co. v. Chicago & A. R.R., 205 S.W. 716 (Mo. 1918); Foley v. New York Sav.
Bank, 79 Misc. 220, 139 N.Y. Supp. 915 (Sup. Ct. 1913).

-Feezer, Acceptance Of Bills Of Exchange By Conduct, 12 Minn. L. Rev. 129,
133 (1927)-

"Section 132 of the NIL provides: "The acceptance of a bill is the signification
by the drawee of his assent to order of the drawer. The acceptance must be in
writing and signed by the drawee. It must not express that the drawee will perform his promise by any other means than the payment of money." A complaint
which fails to allege a written acceptance of a bill of exchange does not state a cause
of action against the drawee. Wadhams v. Portland, V.&=Y. Ry., 37 Wash. 86, 79
Pac. 597 (1905).
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precludes any inference of acceptance by implication by providing that
an acceptance must be signed by the drawee, and in Section 150,24
which provides that upon non-acceptance of the bill within the prescribed time, one must treat the bill as dishonored. Thus it is maintained that since the overall statute is concerned only with tortious
refusals and not inadvertence, the exception should also logically
refer only to tortious refusals.
On the other hand, there are quite cogent reasons for the further
promulgation of the Wisner ruling. One important reason stated in
that case was that making the drawee bank act more expeditiously
would accelerate the entire collection process. During the period that
the drawee bank has possession of the check, but prior to its acceptance, the drawer might place a stop order against the payee or withdraw all his funds from the bank, or the bank might find it necessary
to assert a banker's lien on the drawer's account. These reasons point
up the fact that the collection process should be as rapid as possible
in order to protect the payee.
The Uniform Commercial Code, which has been adopted by sev2
eral states, has eliminated the controversial Section 137 of the NIL, 5
28
as well as other related sections. Under the Uniform Code an acceptance must be in writing, but the drawee bank can be held liable if it is
a converter. 27 Liability as a converter is imposed when the drawee bank
"Section 150 of the NIL provides: "Where a bill is duly presented for acceptance and is not accepted within the prescribed time, the person presenting it
must treat the bill as dishonored by nonacceptance or he loses the right of recourse against the drawer and endorsers." According to a law review note, "It
would seem that not only by its own provisions does Section 137 fail to make mere
retention operate as an acceptance but taken along with Section 15o it is intended
to be understood as meaning that acceptance must be something more than mere
inaction upon the part of the drawee." 12 Minn. L. Rev. 129, 133 (1927). Inadvertent

destruction of the bill was not sufficient to impose liability. Bailey & Co. v. Southwestern Veneer Co., 126 Ark. 257, 190 S.W. 430 (1916).
2Uniform Commercial Code §§ 3-410, 3-419.

nUniform Commercial Code § 3-410 provides:
"(i) Acceptance is the drawee's signed engagement to honor the draft
as presented. It must be written on the draft, and may consist of
his signature alone. It becomes operative when completed by delivery or notification.
(2) A draft may be accepted although it has not been signed by the
drawer or is otherwise incomplete or is overdue or has been dishonored.
(3) Where the draft is payable at a fixed period after sight and the
acceptor fails to date his acceptance the holder may complete it
by supplying a date in good faith."
7-Uniform Commercial Code § 3-410, comment, says that original § 137 has been
eliminated, but the drawee may be liable for a conversion of the instrument under
§ 3-419.
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refuses to return the instrument on demand, or pays on a forged instrument, or when the instrument is delivered to any person who, in
28
turn, refuses either to pay or return the instrument upon demand.
The Uniform Code emphasizes that the purpose for eliminating Section 137 was to make it clear that no one is liable on an instrument
unless and until he has signed it, a signature being prerequisite to the
acceptance. 29
The framers of the Uniform Code saw fit to adopt the older view
that retention alone is not sufficient for acceptance, and this too could
be advanced as an argument against adoption of the rule which Florida
now has by statute. There is a good possibility that other states may
adopt the Uniform Code and that this law may supplant the present
majority rule within the next decade. It should be noted that since
Pennsylvania had adopted the Code in its entirety, 30 the Wisner interpretation probably would not be law in that state today.31
Florida, by statute, has clearly expressed itself with regard to the
problem. By the use of the word "retain" in its statute, Florida has
expanded the basis of liability to include both misfeasance and nonfeasance by providing that negligent nonaction, as well as other
tortious conduct, will be sufficient to hold the drawee bank liable in
the event that there are insufficient funds in the drawer's account.
Moreover, the Florida statute has eliminated the argument that the
NIL, as adopted by many states, applies only to presentment for acceptance and not to presentment for payment by expressly providing in
the statute that a check shall not be deemed "paid or accepted" until
other requirements have been met.
Thus, since 19o8 and the Wisner decision, the common law rule
that inadvertence alone was not sufficient to hold a drawee liable
when he fails to accept or refuse an instrument in the time allotted
has steadily declined in acceptance to the extent that the present
majority rule, adopted by statute in Florida, is that inadvertence alone
is a sufficient basis for imposing liability. However, it should be noted
2'Uniform Commercial Code § 3-419(1).
2Id. at comment 1, 2.

OPa. Stat. Ann. tit. 12A, §§ 3-41o, 3-419 (1954), repealing Pa. Stat. Ann. tit.
56,
326 (1930).
1
3 "Since the enactment of the Amendment to Section 137 in 19o9, no Pennsylvania
case has been found which expressly adjudicated this controversy ....Although
it is now clear in Pennsylvania that an acceptance must be in writing to fall within
the statute... [the] holding does not preclude the finding of an acceptance ..on
the basis ... of conduct." Sherman, Drawee's Liability for Retention of a Check versus
the Pennsylvania NIL, 12 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 522, 524-25 (1951). However, this writing
was prior to Pennsylvania's adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code.
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